All relevant data are within the manuscript. No supporting information files.

1 Introduction {#sec001}
==============

In recent years, with the rising of network economy and e-commerce, in addition to the traditional retail channel, more and more customers or consumers choose to purchase products from the internet channel(direct channel), which have become an important way of products sale. With the changing in customer or consumer buying behavior, more and more companies are beginning to redesign or rebuild their distribution channel structure(Chiang W et al. 2003 \[[@pone.0231699.ref001]\], Tsay A et al. 2004 \[[@pone.0231699.ref002]\], Kenji M 2017 \[[@pone.0231699.ref003]\], Yan W et al. 2018 \[[@pone.0231699.ref004]\]), Such as HP, Nike, Lenovo, in addition to focus on the traditional retail channel, have also opened up an internet channel(direct channel); Dell, MI has been focused on internet channel in the past, and now also began selling products in traditional retail channel; and Apple, Haier sell their products in the traditional retail channel and internet channel in the same time, which used a mixed channel structure. Many facts have proved that the mixed channel structure which composed of the traditional retail channel and the internet channel(direct channel), on the one hand can achieve better customer coverage and penetration(Jerath K et al. 2017 \[[@pone.0231699.ref005]\], Tian L et al. 2018 \[[@pone.0231699.ref006]\]), on the other hand may also lead to different distribution channels conflict, competition and imbalance(Chen J et al. 2017 \[[@pone.0231699.ref007]\], Lan Y et al. 2018 \[[@pone.0231699.ref008]\]).

Nowadays, more and more researchers focus on how to design a distribution channels strategy and determine a product quality control strategy in different types of distribution channels in a three echelon supply chain that is composed by one manufacturer, one retailer and the final customer, which have become one of hot research fields in supply chain management. However, nowadays the research field has three potential systemic problems: first of all, how to design different types of distribution channels structure in a three echelon supply chain(direct channel, retail channel and mixed channel); what's more, the different types of distribution channels structure in supply chain how to influence the manufacturer's product quality decision and quality prevention strategy, the retailer's product pricing decision and quality inspection strategy, and the final customer's product demand decision; above all, how to influence the manufacturer's and retailer's expected profits function and the final customer's consumer surplus, and how to determine a product quality control strategy in order to eliminate "channel conflict" and "free-riding behavior". All of these problems and difficulties have not been fully resolved, which are also important research directions for current researchers.

In this paper, we will construct a distribution channel strategy model in a three echelon supply chain that is composed of one manufacturer, one retailer and a final customer based on a three-stage stackelberg dynamic game. Furthermore, we will introduce the distribution channel demand elasticity ratio and investigate how to craft a product quality control strategy in three types of distribution channels (direct channel, retail channel, and mixed channel), which will eliminate the influence of "channel conflict" and "free-riding behavior". Most important, we will determine the manufacturer's product quality level, quality prevention effort level, wholesale price, direct sale price, and the retailer's product quality inspection effort level and retail price, the manufacturer's and retailer's expected profits function, and the final customer's consumer surplus. Then, we will conduct a numerical sample analysis that will indicate a specific application in practice.

2 Related literature {#sec002}
====================

This paper is chiefly related to three streams of literature. The first stream is the research on how to design a distribution channels structure strategy, the different types of distribution channels structure and how to influence the product quality decision in a supply chain. Yunchuan Liu (2011) \[[@pone.0231699.ref009]\] established a channel model to analyze the benefits of competitive upward channel decentralization. Anastasios X (2012) \[[@pone.0231699.ref010]\] studied how to apply optimal newsvendor policies for a dual-sourcing channel in a supply chain. Hongyan Shi et al. (2013) \[[@pone.0231699.ref011]\] analyzed consumer heterogeneity and product quality and how to influence the coordination of distribution channels. Guangye Xu et al. (2014) \[[@pone.0231699.ref012]\] constructed a two-way revenue contract to coordinate a dual-channel supply chain. Salma Karray (2015) \[[@pone.0231699.ref013]\] investigated how vertical strategy and horizontal strategy influence cooperative promotions in the distribution channel. Kenji M (2016) \[[@pone.0231699.ref014]\] investigated the optimal product distribution strategy for a manufacturer that used dual-channel supply chains. Kinshuk J et al. (2017) \[[@pone.0231699.ref015]\] discussed how to make a product quality level decision in a distribution channel with demand uncertainty. Liu Yan et al. (2018) \[[@pone.0231699.ref016]\] provide insights on how market size uncertainty affects the optimal quality and quantity provision in distribution channels. Ranjan A and Jha J (2019) \[[@pone.0231699.ref017]\] investigate the pricing strategies, green quality and coordination mechanism between the members in a dual-channel supply chain.

The second stream pertains to designing a product quality contract and establishing a quality incentive mechanism in a supply chain. Peng Ma et al. (2013) \[[@pone.0231699.ref018]\] created a product quality contract design for two-stage supply chain coordination through integrating manufacturer-quality and retailer-marketing efforts. Jie Zhang et al. (2014) \[[@pone.0231699.ref019]\] discussed a strategic pricing method with reference effects in a quality competitive supply chain. Raaid B et al. (2016) \[[@pone.0231699.ref020]\] analyzed the effect of adopting a dual-channel on the performance of a two-level supply chain. Chen J et al. (2017) \[[@pone.0231699.ref007]\] consider the supply chains can be centralized or decentralized, and demonstrate that quality improvement can be realized when a new channel is introduced. Li Wei and Chen Jing (2018) \[[@pone.0231699.ref021]\] develop game-theoretic models in which the retailer sells a product in two quality-differentiated brands to demonstrate that the quality difference. Zhang J et al. (2019) \[[@pone.0231699.ref022]\] use an analytical model to study the interrelationship between a platform's contract choice and a manufacturer's product quality decision.

The third stream of related literature concerns research on product quality risk sharing and the quality strategy of distribution channels in a supply chain. Zhu Lilong et al. (2011) \[[@pone.0231699.ref023]\] explored manufacturers' moral hazard strategy and quality contract design in a two-echelon supply chain. Cinzia B et al. (2012) \[[@pone.0231699.ref024]\] discussed product quality-driven innovation with the design of a quality control contract. Christina Wong et al. (2013) \[[@pone.0231699.ref025]\] investigated the combined effects of internal and external supply chain integration on product quality innovation. Rui H and Lai G (2015) \[[@pone.0231699.ref026]\] investigated the deferred payment and inspection mechanisms for mitigating supplier's product quality risk. Xiao T and Jim Shi (2016) \[[@pone.0231699.ref027]\] studied a manufacturer marketing a product and considered the pricing and channel priority strategies of dual-channel supply chain. Wang S.J et al. (2017) \[[@pone.0231699.ref028]\] explore interaction of channel structure with price-and quality-based competition between two manufacturers. Lin T and Jiang B (2018) \[[@pone.0231699.ref029]\] discussed the effects of consumer-to-consumer product sharing risk and profit on different distribution channel structure.

In this paper, first of all, we will introduce the distribution channel demand elasticity ratio and investigating how to construct a product quality control strategy model and channel coordination in three types of distribution channels (direct channel, retail channel, and mixed channel); what's more, we consider the manufacturer's product quality decision and quality prevention strategy, the retailer's product pricing decision and quality inspection strategy, and the final customer's product demand decision in a three-echelon supply chain; above all, we also establish a product quality control strategy model in three types of distribution channels to eliminate the influence of "channel conflict" and "free-riding behavior", which will improve the manufacturer's and retailer's expected profits and the final customer's consumer surplus.

The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: in section 3, we describe the model and the basic assumption; in section 4, we consider the product quality strategy in the direct channel and determine the first-best contact parameters; in section 5, we investigate the product quality strategy in the retail channel and establish the manufacturer's and retailer's stackelberg "leader-follower" quality control model, and we compare the contract parameter differences with the direct channel. In section 6, we investigate the product quality strategy in the mixed channel that includes a retail channel and a direct channel scenario simultaneously, and in section 7 we present a numerical example analysis to verify our model results. Finally, we provide the research conclusions and direction for future research.

3 The model and assumption {#sec003}
==========================

In this paper, we establish a three-echelon supply chain structure that consists of a risk-neutral manufacturer and retailer, and the final customer. The manufacturer first makes decision of the product quality. *q*~*i*~ is the manufacturer's product quality level; furthermore, *i* ∈ {*D*,*R*,*MC*} denote the direct channel, the retail channel and the mixed channel respectively. The product quality cost function is $C_{i}(q_{i}) = kq_{i}^{2}/2$ (*k* is the manufacturer's production technology elasticity); so, we assume $C_{i}^{'}(q_{i}) > 0$, $C_{i}^{"}(q_{i}) > 0$ and *C*~*i*~ (0) = *C*~*i*~′(0) = 0, *C*~*i*~′(+∞) = +∞, i.e. *C*~*i*~(*q*~*i*~) is the convex function of increasing marginal cost. *λ*~*m*~ is the manufacturer's product quality prevention effort level, and *λ*~*m*~ ∈\[0,+∞); then, we can obtain that the manufacturer's product quality prevention level is $(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}})$. Furthermore, $(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) \in \lbrack 0,1\rbrack$, and the corresponding manufacturer's quality prevention cost function is $(1 - e^{- \lambda_{r}})$*C*~*m*~(*λ*~*m*~) = *η*~*m*~*λ*~*m*~, *η*~*m*~ is the manufacturer' quality prevention cost elasticity. The parameter *w* is the manufacturer's wholesale price, *P*~*D*~ is the direct sale price in a direct channel, and *T* is the manufacturer's transfer payment to the retailer in order to eliminate the manufacturer's and retailer's channel conflict.

The retailer purchases the product from the upstream manufacturer and makes decision of the product quality inspection. λ~*r*~ is the retailer's quality inspection effort level, and $\lambda_{r} \in \lbrack 0, + \infty)$; then, the retailer's product quality inspection level is $(1 - e^{- \lambda_{r}})$. Furthermore, $(1 - e^{- \lambda_{r}}) \in \lbrack 0,1\rbrack$, and the corresponding retailer's quality inspection cost function is $(1 - e^{- \lambda_{r}})$ *C*~*r*~(*λ*~*r*~) = *η*~*r*~*λ*~*r*~, *η*~*r*~ is the retailer's quality inspection cost elasticity. The parameter *p*~*R*~ is the retailer's retail price.

The final customer's quality utility is *θq*~*i*~, and *θ* denotes the type of final customer; then, we assume *θ \~ U*\[*a*, *b*\] uniform distribution, i.e. *a* is the final customer lower limit of distribution quantity, *b* is the final customer upper limit of distribution quantity, and the corresponding final customer's consumer surplus is (*θq*~*i*~ *-- p*~*i*~).

The final customer's product demand function will be $D_{i}(q_{i}) = \alpha - \beta_{i}p_{i}/q_{i}$; α denotes the market maximum demand, and *β*~*i*~ is the product demand price elasticity.

In this paper, the manufacturer will determine the three types of distribution channels including a direct channel, a retail channel and a mixed channel. The three-stage stackelberg game is in the following order: in stage one, the manufacturer determines the product quality level in a different distribution channel and determines the product quality prevention effort level; in stage two, the manufacturer determines the wholesale price in a retail channel or the direct sale price in a direct channel; and in stage three, the retailer determines the product quality inspection effort level and the retail price.

And then, the three types of distribution channels decision system is described as [Fig 1](#pone.0231699.g001){ref-type="fig"}.

![Three types of distribution channels decision system.](pone.0231699.g001){#pone.0231699.g001}

4 Product quality strategy in direct channel {#sec004}
============================================

In the direct channel, the manufacturer sells its product to the final customer directly through an internet or online ordering system; then, the manufacturer determines the product quality level, the quality prevention effort level and the direct sale price. Therefore, the manufacturer's expected profits' function model is as follows. $$Max\Pi_{M}^{D}(q_{D},\lambda_{m},p_{D}) = (p_{D} - kq_{D}^{2}/2)(\alpha - \beta_{D}p_{D}/q_{D})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) - \eta_{m}\lambda_{m}$$ The manufacturer's decision variables are the product quality level *q*~*D*~, the quality prevention effort level *λ*~*m*~ and the direct sale price *p*~*D*~.

**Proposition 1** In the direct channel, with the final customer's product demand price elasticity decreases, the manufacturer's product quality level and direct sale price will increase, and the quality prevention effort level will also increase. In this scenario, the manufacturer's expected profits' function is concave; i.e. an optimal product quality level exists that will to be maximum. Then, the final customer's consumer surplus will increase with the decreasing in the demand price elasticity.

**Proof.** Based on the stackelberg game analysis, this paper will use the backward induction method to solve the equation. Thus, using the first-order and second-order optimal condition with respect to *p*~*D*~ in formula (1) yields the following: $$\partial\Pi_{M}^{D}/\partial p_{D} = (\alpha - \beta_{D}p_{D}/q_{D})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) + (p_{D} - kq_{D}^{2}/2)( - \beta_{D}/q_{D})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) = 0$$ $$\partial^{2}\Pi_{M}^{D}/\partial p_{D}^{2} = ( - \beta_{D}/q_{D})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) + \ ( - \beta_{D}/q_{D})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) < 0$$ $$\therefore p_{D} = (\alpha q_{D} + k\beta_{D}q_{D}^{2}/2)/2\beta_{D}$$ Then, we substitute [Eq (4)](#pone.0231699.e015){ref-type="disp-formula"} into formula (1) and use first-order and second-order optimal conditions with respect to *λ*~*m*~, which yields the following: $$Max\Pi_{M}^{D}(q_{D},\lambda_{m}) = (\alpha q_{D}/2\beta_{D} - kq_{D}^{2}/4)(\alpha/2 - k\beta_{D}q_{D}/4)(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) - \eta_{m}\lambda_{m}$$ $$\partial\Pi_{M}^{D}(q_{D},\lambda_{m})/\partial\lambda_{m} = (\alpha q_{D}/2\beta_{D} - kq_{D}^{2}/4)(\alpha/2 - k\beta_{D}q_{D}/4)e^{- \lambda_{m}} - \eta_{m} = 0$$ $$\partial^{2}\Pi_{M}^{D}(q_{D},\lambda_{m})/\partial\lambda_{m}^{2} = - (\alpha q_{D}/2\beta_{D} - kq_{D}^{2}/4)(\alpha/2 - k\beta_{D}q_{D}/4)e^{- \lambda_{m}} < 0\mspace{9mu}\left( \text{concave\ function} \right)$$ Therefore, we derive that $${\lambda_{m}}^{D} = \text{ln}(\alpha q_{D}/2\beta_{D} - kq_{D}^{2}/4)(\alpha/2 - k\beta_{D}q_{D}/4)/\eta_{m}$$ Based on the above analysis, we conclude that *p*~*D*~ and *λ*~*m*~^D^ is the manufacturer's first-best sales price, and the quality effort level occurs with a direct channel.

Thereafter, we use the first-order and second-order optimal conditions with respect to *q*~*D*~ in [Eq (5)](#pone.0231699.e016){ref-type="disp-formula"}, which yields the following: $$\partial\Pi_{M}^{D}(q_{D})/\partial q_{D} = (\alpha/2\beta_{D} - kq_{D}/2)(\alpha/2 - k\beta_{D}q_{D}/4)(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}})$$ $$- (\alpha q_{D}/2\beta_{D} - kq_{D}^{2}/4)( - k\beta_{D}/4)(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) = 0$$ $$q_{D} = 2\alpha/3k\beta_{D}\ \text{or}\ q_{D} = 2\alpha/k\beta_{D}$$ $$\because\partial^{2}\Pi_{M}^{D}(q_{D})/\partial q_{D}^{2} < 0\ \left( \text{concave\ function} \right)$$ $$\therefore q_{D} < 4\alpha/3k\beta_{D}$$ Combine Eqs [(9)](#pone.0231699.e022){ref-type="disp-formula"} and [(10)](#pone.0231699.e024){ref-type="disp-formula"}, we derive that $$q_{D}^{*} = 2\alpha/3k\beta_{D}$$ $$\partial q_{D}^{*}/\partial\beta_{D} = - 2\alpha/3k\beta_{D}^{2} < 0\mspace{9mu}\left( \text{monotonically\ decreasing\ function} \right)$$ We substitute [Eq (11)](#pone.0231699.e025){ref-type="disp-formula"} into Eqs [(4)](#pone.0231699.e015){ref-type="disp-formula"} and [(7)](#pone.0231699.e019){ref-type="disp-formula"}, respectively, to obtain the following $$p_{D}^{*} = 4\alpha^{2}/9k\beta_{D}^{2},\ \lambda_{m}^{D*} = \text{ln}2\alpha^{3}/27k\eta_{m}\beta_{D}^{2}$$ $$\partial p_{D}^{*}/\partial\beta_{D} = - 8\alpha^{2}/9k\beta_{D}^{3} < 0,\mspace{9mu}\partial\lambda_{m}^{D*}/\partial\beta_{D} = - 2/\beta_{D} < 0$$ Thereafter, we substitute Eqs [(11)](#pone.0231699.e025){ref-type="disp-formula"} and [(12)](#pone.0231699.e027){ref-type="disp-formula"} into formula (1), and we obtain that $${\prod_{M}^{D*} =}2\alpha^{3}/27k\beta_{D}^{2} - \eta_{m}(1 + \text{ln}2\alpha^{3}/27k\eta_{m}\beta_{D}^{2})$$ Therefore, we can describe the final customer's consumer surplus as follows: $$\therefore CS^{D*} = {\int_{a}^{b}{(\theta q_{D}^{*} - p_{D}^{*})f(\theta)d\theta}} = (a + b)\alpha/3k\beta_{D} - 4\alpha^{2}/9k\beta_{D}^{2}$$ $$\therefore\partial CS^{D*}/\partial\beta_{D} = - (3(a + b)\beta_{D}\alpha - 8\alpha^{2})/9k\beta_{D}^{3} < 0\left( \text{monotonically\ decreasing\ function} \right)$$

QED {#sec005}
---

Based on proposition 1, we conclude that, in the direct channel, the manufacturer's product quality level, the direct sale price and the quality prevention effort level will increase with a decrease in the final customer's product demand price elasticity. In addition, the manufacturer's expected profits function is concave, and $q_{D}^{*}$ and $\prod_{M}^{D*}{(q_{D}^{*})}$ is the manufacturer's optimal quality level and maximum expected profits. Thereafter, the final customer's consumer surplus will increase with the decrease in demand price elasticity.

5 Product quality strategy in retail channel {#sec006}
============================================

In the retail channel, the manufacturer sells product to the retailer, which will determine a product quality inspection strategy and then sell the product to the final customer. The manufacturer determines the product quality level, the quality prevention effort level and the wholesale price, and the retailer determines the quality inspection level and the retail price. Therefore, the manufacturer's and retailer's stackelberg "leader-follower" control model is described as follows: $$Max\Pi_{M}^{R}(q_{R},\lambda_{m},w) = (w - kq_{R}^{2}/2)(\alpha - \beta_{R}p_{R}/q_{R})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) - \eta_{m}\lambda_{m}$$ $$s.t.\left\{ {\lambda_{r},p_{R}} \right\} = \text{arg}\ Max\Pi_{R}^{R}(\lambda_{r},p_{R})$$ $$Max\Pi_{R}^{R}(\lambda_{r},p_{R}) = (p_{R} - w)(\alpha - \beta_{R}p_{R}/q_{R})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{r}}) - \eta_{r}\lambda_{r}$$ Therefore, formula (15) is the manufacturer's expected profits function; formula (16) is the retailer's expected profits function.

**Proposition 2** In the retail channel, with the final customer's product demand price elasticity decreases, the manufacturer's product quality level and wholesale price will increase, and the retailer's product retail price will also increase. In comparison with the direct channel scenario, the product quality level and the retail price will be much higher.

**Proof.** In this paper, we still use the backward induction method to solve the model. Thus, we use the first-order optimal condition with respect to *p*~*R*~ and *λ*~*r*~ in formula (16), which yields the following: $$(\alpha - \beta_{R}p_{R}/q_{R})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{r}}) + (p_{R} - w)( - \beta_{R}/q_{R})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{r}}) = 0$$ $$(p_{R} - w)(\alpha - \beta_{R}p_{R}/q_{R})e^{- \lambda_{r}} - \eta_{r} = 0$$ Therefore, we derive that $$p_{R} = (\alpha q_{R} + \beta_{R}w)/2\beta_{R},\ \ \lambda_{r} = \text{ln}(p_{R} - w)(\alpha - \beta_{R}p_{R}q_{R}^{- 1})/\eta_{r}$$ We substitute [Eq (19)](#pone.0231699.e039){ref-type="disp-formula"} into formula (15) and use the first-order optimal condition with respect to *w*, and we obtain that $$Max\Pi_{M}^{R}(q_{R},\lambda_{m},w) = (w - kq_{R}^{2}/2)(\alpha/2 - \beta_{R}w/2q_{R})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) - \eta_{m}\lambda_{m} = 0$$ $$\partial\Pi_{M}^{R}(q_{R},\lambda_{m},w)/\partial w = 0,\ w^{R} = \alpha q_{R}/2\beta_{R} + kq_{R}^{2}/4$$ We substitute [Eq (21)](#pone.0231699.e041){ref-type="disp-formula"} into formula (20) and use the first-order optimal condition with respect to *λ*~*m*~, which yields the following: $$Max\Pi_{M}^{R}(q_{R},\lambda_{m}) = (\alpha q_{R}/2\beta_{R} - kq_{R}^{2}/4)(\alpha/4 - k\beta_{R}q_{R}/8)(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) - \eta_{m}\lambda_{m} = 0$$ $$\partial\Pi_{M}^{R}(q_{R},\lambda_{m})/\partial\lambda_{m} = 0,\ \lambda_{m}^{R} = \text{ln}(\alpha q_{R}/2\beta_{R} - kq_{R}^{2}/4)(\alpha/4 - k\beta_{R}q_{R}/8)/\eta_{m}$$ Thereafter, we use first-order and second-order optimal conditions with respect to $q_{R}$ in formula (22), which yields the following: $$\partial\Pi_{M}^{R}(q_{R})/\partial q_{R} = (\alpha/2\beta_{R} - kq_{R}/2)(\alpha/4 - k\beta_{R}q_{R}/8)(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}})$$ $$- (\alpha q_{R}/2\beta_{R} - kq_{R}^{2}/4)( - k\beta_{R}/8)(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) = 0$$ $$\therefore q_{R} = 2\alpha/3k\beta_{R}\ \text{or}\ q_{R} = 2\alpha/k\beta_{R}$$ $$\because\partial^{2}\Pi_{M}^{R}(q_{R})/\partial q_{R}^{2} < 0\ \left( \text{concave\ function} \right)$$ $$\therefore q_{R} < 4\alpha/3k\beta_{R}$$ Therefore, we obtain that $$q_{R}^{*} = 2\alpha/3k\beta_{R}$$ $$\partial q_{R}^{*}/\partial\beta_{R} = - 2\alpha/3k\beta_{R}^{2} < 0\ \left( \text{decreasing\ function} \right)$$ We substitute [Eq (25)](#pone.0231699.e050){ref-type="disp-formula"} into formula (21) and (23) and rearrange as follows: $$w^{R*} = 4\alpha^{2}/9k\beta_{R}^{2},\mspace{9mu}\lambda_{m}^{R*} = \text{ln}\ \alpha^{3}/27k\eta_{m}\beta_{R}^{2}$$ Therefore, we substitute Eqs [(25)](#pone.0231699.e050){ref-type="disp-formula"} and [(26)](#pone.0231699.e052){ref-type="disp-formula"} into formula (19) and rearrange as follows: $$p_{R}^{*} = 5\alpha^{2}/9k\beta_{R}^{2},\mspace{9mu}\lambda_{r}^{R*} = \text{ln}\ \alpha^{3}/54k\eta_{r}\beta_{R}^{2}$$ $$\partial w^{R*}/\partial\beta_{R} = - 8\alpha^{2}/9k\beta_{R}^{3} < 0,\ \partial p_{R}^{*}/\partial\beta_{R} = - 10\alpha^{2}/9k\beta_{R}^{3} < 0$$ Based on the assumption condition and the Y.C Liu (2011) and Salma Karray (2015) research results, we assume *β*~*D*~ = *εβ*~*R*~, where *ε* is the demand elasticity ratio in a different distribution channel condition and *ε* \>1. The demand price elasticity for the direct channel will be greater than for the retail channel; i.e., the final customers are more sensitive to price in the direct channel. Samar K.M (2008) earlier had proved that *η*~*m*~ = *η*~*r*~.

We compare Eqs [(25)](#pone.0231699.e050){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(26)](#pone.0231699.e052){ref-type="disp-formula"} and [(27)](#pone.0231699.e053){ref-type="disp-formula"} with Eqs [(11)](#pone.0231699.e025){ref-type="disp-formula"} and [(12)](#pone.0231699.e027){ref-type="disp-formula"}, respectively, as follows: $$\because q_{R}^{*} - q_{D}^{*} > 0,\mspace{9mu}\therefore q_{R}^{*} > q_{D}^{*}$$ $$\because p_{R}^{*} - w^{R*} > 0,\mspace{9mu} w^{R*} - p_{D}^{*} > 0\ \text{and}\ p_{R}^{*} - p_{D}^{*} > 0,\mspace{9mu}\therefore p_{R}^{*} > w^{R*} > p_{D}^{*}$$

QED {#sec007}
---

Based on proposition 2, we conclude that the manufacturer's product quality level in the retail channel will be much higher than that in the direct channel scenario; the retailer's retail price will be greater than the wholesale price, which will be also much higher than the manufacturer's sales price in the direct channel scenario.

**Corollary 2.1** $\lambda_{m}^{R*} > \lambda_{r}^{R*} > \lambda_{m}^{D*}$ (*ε* \> 2).

**Proof.** We compare the manufacturer's quality prevention effort level and the retailer's quality inspection effort level in the retail channel with that in the direct channel; then, we determine that $$\because\lambda_{m}^{R*} - \lambda_{m}^{D*} = \text{ln}\ \alpha^{3}/27k\eta_{m}\beta_{R}^{2} - \text{ln}\ 2\alpha^{3}/27k\eta_{m}\beta_{D}^{2} = \text{ln}\ \beta_{D}^{2}/2\beta_{R}^{2} = \text{ln}\ \varepsilon^{2}/2 > 0(\varepsilon > \sqrt{2})$$ $$\lambda_{m}^{R*} - \lambda_{m}^{R*} = \text{ln}\ \alpha^{3}/27k\eta_{m}\beta_{R}^{2} - \text{ln}\ \alpha^{3}/54k\eta_{r}\beta_{R}^{2} = \text{ln}\ 2\eta_{r}/\eta_{m} > 0$$ $$\lambda_{r}^{R*} - \lambda_{m}^{D*} = \text{ln}\ \alpha^{3}/54k\eta_{r}\beta_{R}^{2} - \text{ln}\ 2\alpha^{3}/27k\eta_{m}\beta_{D}^{2}$$ $$= \text{ln}\ \beta_{D}^{2}\eta_{m}/4\beta_{R}^{2}\eta_{r} = \text{ln}\ \varepsilon^{2}\eta_{m}/4\eta_{r} > 0(\varepsilon > 2)$$ $$\text{We\ conclude\ that}\ \lambda_{m}^{R*} > \lambda_{r}^{R*} > \lambda_{m}^{D*}(\varepsilon > 2)$$

QED {#sec008}
---

Based on corollary 2.1, we can infer that the manufacturer's quality prevention effort level in the retail channel will be greater than the retailer's quality inspection effort level, which will also be greater than the manufacturer's quality prevention effort level in the direct channel.

**Corollary 2.2** $\prod_{M}^{R*}{(q_{R}^{*})}$ \> $\prod_{M}^{D*}{(q_{D}^{*})}$.

**Proof.** We substitute formula (25), (26) and (27) into Eqs [(15)](#pone.0231699.e034){ref-type="disp-formula"} and [(16)](#pone.0231699.e036){ref-type="disp-formula"}; then, we find that $$\therefore{\prod_{M}^{R*} =}2\alpha^{3}/27k\beta_{R}^{2} - \eta_{m}(1 + \text{ln}\ \alpha^{3}/27k\eta_{m}\beta_{R}^{2})$$ $${\prod_{R}^{R*} =}\alpha^{3}/54k\beta_{R}^{2} - \eta_{r}(1 + \ \text{ln}\ \alpha^{3}/54k\eta_{r}\beta_{R}^{2})$$ Therefore, we compare formula (28) with (29) to obtain that $$\therefore\prod_{M}^{R*} - \prod_{M}^{D*} = 2\alpha^{3}(\beta_{D}^{2} - \beta_{R}^{2})/27k\beta_{D}^{2}\beta_{R}^{2} + \eta_{m}\text{ln}\ 2\beta_{R}^{2}/\beta_{D}^{2} > 0$$ $$\therefore\text{we\ obtain\ that}\ \prod_{M}^{R*} > \prod_{M}^{D*}$$

QED {#sec009}
---

Based on corollary 2.2, we conclude that the manufacturer's expected profits in the retail channel will be greater than that in the direct channel scenario.

**Corollary 2.3.** *CS^R\*^* (*q*\**~R~*, *p*\**~R~*) \> *CS^D\*^* (*q*\**~D~*, *p*\**~D~*).

**Proof.** The final customer's consumer surplus in the retail channel will be described as follows $$CS^{R*} = {\int_{a}^{b}{(\theta q_{R}^{*} - p_{R}^{*})f(\theta)d\theta}} = (a + b)\alpha/3k\beta_{R} - 5\alpha^{2}/9k\beta_{R}^{2}$$ Therefore, we compare formula (30) with (14) to obtain $$\because CS^{R*} - CS^{D*} = (a + b)\alpha(\beta_{D} - \beta_{R})/3k\beta_{D}\beta_{R} - \alpha^{2}(5\beta_{D}^{2} - 4\beta_{R}^{2})/9k\beta_{D}^{2}\beta_{R}^{2}$$ We obtain $CS^{R*} > CS^{D*}$

QED {#sec010}
---

Based on corollary 2.3, we conclude that the final customer's consumer surplus in the retail channel will be greater than that in the direct channel.

6 Product quality strategy in mixed channel {#sec011}
===========================================

In the mixed channel, the manufacturer may sell a product to the final customer directly through an online ordering system or sell wholesale to the retailer who will continue to sell the product to the final customer. Thereafter, the manufacturer will determine a transfer payment to the retailer to eliminate the channel conflict. Therefore, the manufacturer determines the product quality level, the quality prevention effort level, the wholesale price and the direct sale price, and the retailer determines the quality inspection level and the retail price. The manufacturer and the retailer's stackelberg "leader-follower" control model can be described as follows: $$Max\Pi_{M}^{MC}(q_{MC},\lambda_{m},w,P_{D}) = (p_{D} - kq_{MC}^{2}/2)(\alpha - \beta_{D}p_{D}/q_{MC})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}})$$ $$+ (w - kq_{MC}^{2}/2)(\alpha - \beta_{R}p_{R}/q_{MC})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) - \eta_{m}\lambda_{m} - T$$ $$s.t.\left\{ {\lambda_{r},p_{R}} \right\} = \arg Max\Pi_{R}^{MC}(\lambda_{r},p_{R})$$ $$Max\Pi_{R}^{MC}(\lambda_{r},p_{R}) = (p_{R} - w)(\alpha - \beta_{R}p_{R}/q_{MC})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{r}}) - \eta_{r}\lambda_{r} + T$$ Therefore, formula (31) is the manufacturer's expected profits function, formula (32) is the retailer's expected profits function, and *T* is the transfer payment.

**Proposition 3** In the mixed channel, in comparison with a direct channel and a retail channel scenario, the manufacturer's product quality level will be greater than which in the direct channel and less than which in the retail channel, i.e. $q_{D}^{*} < q_{MC}^{*} \leq q_{R}^{*}$, the wholesale price will decrease, i.e. $W^{MC*} \leq w^{R*}$, and the manufacturer's direct sale price will increase, i.e. $p_{D}^{MC*} > p_{D}^{*}$. In addition, the retailer's retail price will decrease, i.e. $p_{R}^{MC*} \leq p_{R}^{*}$.

**Proof.** We still use the backward induction method to solve the model. Thus, we use the first-order optimal condition with respect to *p~R~* and *λ~r~* in formula (32), which yields the following: $$(\alpha - \beta_{R}p_{R}/q_{MC})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{r}}) + (p_{R} - w)( - \beta_{R}/q_{MC})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{r}}) = 0$$ $$(p_{R} - w)(\alpha - \beta_{R}p_{R}/q_{MC})e^{- \lambda_{r}} - \eta_{r} = 0$$ $$\because\partial^{2}\prod_{R}^{MC}/\partial p_{R}^{2} = - 2\beta_{R}(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}})/q_{MC} < 0\ \left( \text{concave\ function} \right)$$ $$\therefore{p_{R}}^{MC} = (\alpha q_{MC} + \beta_{R}w)/2\beta_{R};\mspace{9mu}{\lambda_{r}}^{MC} = \text{ln}\ (p_{R} - w)(\alpha - \beta_{R}p_{R}q_{MC}^{- 1})/\eta_{r}$$ We substitute formula (36) into formula (31), which yields the following $$Max\Pi_{M}^{MC}(q_{MC},\lambda_{m},w,P_{D}) = (p_{D} - 2^{- 1}kq_{MC}^{2})(\alpha - \beta_{D}p_{D}/q_{MC})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}})$$ $$+ (w - 2^{- 1}kq_{MC}^{2})(\alpha/2 - \beta_{R}w/2q_{MC})(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) - \eta_{m}\lambda_{m} - T$$ Therefore, we use the first-best condition *w* and *p~D~* in formula (37) and obtain that $$\therefore w^{MC} = \alpha q_{MC}/2\beta_{R} + kq_{MC}^{2}/4,\mspace{9mu} p_{D}^{MC} = \alpha q_{MC}/2\beta_{D} + kq_{MC}^{2}/4$$ Thereafter, we substitute formula (38) into formula (37), which yields the following $$Max\Pi_{M}^{MC}(q_{MC},\lambda_{m}) = (\alpha q_{MC}/2\beta_{D} - 4^{- 1}kq_{MC}^{2})(\alpha/2 - \beta_{D}kq_{MC}/4)(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}})$$ $$+ (\alpha q_{MC}/2\beta_{R} - 4^{- 1}kq_{MC}^{2})(\alpha/4 - \beta_{R}kq_{MC}/8)(1 - e^{- \lambda_{m}}) - \eta_{m}\lambda_{m} - T$$ We use the first-best condition $\lambda_{m}$ and first-best and second-best condition $q_{MC}$ and obtain that $$\lambda_{m}^{MC} = \text{ln}\ \eta_{m}^{- 1}\lbrack(\frac{\alpha q_{MC}}{2\beta_{D}} - \frac{kq_{MC}^{2}}{4})(\frac{\alpha}{2} - \frac{\beta_{D}kq_{MC}}{4}) + (\frac{\alpha q_{MC}}{2\beta_{R}} - \frac{kq_{MC}^{2}}{4})(\frac{\alpha}{4} - \frac{\beta_{R}kq_{MC}}{8})\rbrack$$ $$\because\partial\prod_{M}^{MC}(q_{MC})/\partial q_{MC} = 0,\mspace{9mu}\partial^{2}\prod_{M}^{MC}(q_{MC})/\partial q_{MC}^{2}\  < 0\ \left( \text{concave\ function} \right)$$ $$\therefore q_{MC}^{*} = 2\alpha(4 - m)/3k(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R}),\mspace{9mu} m = {(10 - 3(\varepsilon + \varepsilon^{- 1}))}^{1/2}\mspace{9mu}\left( {2 < \varepsilon \leq 3} \right)$$ Therefore, we substitute formula (42) into formula (36), (38) and (40) and obtain that $$\therefore w^{MC*} = \alpha^{2}(4 - m)/3k\beta_{R}(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R}) + \alpha^{2}{(4 - m)}^{2}/9k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{2}$$ $$\lambda_{m}^{MC*} = \text{ln}\ {\eta_{m}}^{- 1}\lbrack\alpha^{3}(4 - m)/6k\beta_{D}\beta_{R} - \alpha^{3}{(4 - m)}^{2}(8 + m)/54k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{2}\rbrack$$ $$p_{D}^{MC*} = \alpha^{2}(4 - m)/3k\beta_{D}(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R}) + \alpha^{2}{(4 - m)}^{2}/9k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{2}$$ $$p_{R}^{MC*} = \alpha^{2}(4 - m)/2k\beta_{R}(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R}) + \alpha^{2}{(4 - m)}^{2}/18k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{2}$$ $$\lambda_{r}^{MC*} = \text{ln}\ {\eta_{r}}^{- 1}\lbrack\frac{\alpha^{3}(4 - m)}{24k\beta_{R}(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})} + \frac{\alpha^{3}{(4 - m)}^{3}\beta_{R}}{216k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{3}} - \frac{\alpha^{3}{(4 - m)}^{2}}{36k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{2}}\rbrack$$ We compare the product quality level, the wholesale price, the sales price and the retail price in the mixed channel, with which in the direct channel and the retail channel scenario yields the following: $$\because q_{MC}^{*}/q_{D}^{*} = \beta_{D}(4 - m)/(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R}) > 1(2 < \varepsilon \leq 3)$$ $$q_{MC}^{*}/q_{R}^{*} = \beta_{R}(4 - m)/(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R}) = \left\{ \begin{matrix}
{< 1,} & {2 < \varepsilon < 3} \\
{= 1,} & {\varepsilon = 3} \\
\end{matrix} \right.$$ $$\therefore q_{D}^{*} < q_{MC}^{*} \leq q_{R}^{*}$$ $$\therefore w^{MC*} - w^{R*} = \frac{\alpha^{2}(4 - m)}{3k(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}(\frac{1}{\beta_{R}} + \frac{4 - m}{3(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}) - \frac{4\alpha^{2}}{9k\beta_{R}^{2}} = \left\{ \begin{matrix}
{< 0,} & {2 < \varepsilon < 3} \\
{= 0,} & {\varepsilon = 3} \\
\end{matrix} \right.$$ $$p_{D}^{*} - p_{D}^{MC*} = \frac{4\alpha^{2}}{9k\beta_{D}^{2}} - \frac{\alpha^{2}{(4 - m)}^{2}}{9k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{2}} - \frac{\alpha^{2}(4 - m)}{3k\beta_{D}(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})} < 0$$ $$p_{R}^{*} - p_{R}^{MC*} = \frac{5\alpha^{2}}{9k\beta_{R}^{2}} - \frac{\alpha^{2}{(4 - m)}^{2}}{18k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{2}} - \frac{\alpha^{2}(4 - m)}{2k\beta_{R}(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})} = \left\{ \begin{matrix}
{> 0,} & {2 < \varepsilon < 3} \\
{= 0,} & {\varepsilon = 3} \\
\end{matrix} \right.$$ Then we can infer that $w^{MC*} \leq w^{R*}$, $P_{D}^{*} < p_{D}^{MC*}$ and $p_{R}^{MC*} \leq p_{R}^{*}$.

QED {#sec012}
---

Based on proposition 3, we conclude that, in the mixed channel, the manufacturer's product quality level will be greater than which in the direct channel and less than which in the retail channel. In addition, the wholesale price will decrease, the manufacturer's direct sale price will increase and the retailer's retail price will decrease.

**Corollary 3.1** $\lambda_{m}^{MC*} \geq \lambda_{m}^{R*} > \lambda_{m}^{D*}$, $\lambda_{r}^{MC*} \geq \lambda_{r}^{R*}$.

**Proof.** We compare the manufacturer's quality prevention effort level and the retailer's quality inspection effort level in the mixed channel with which in the direct channel and the retail channel scenario and obtain the following: $$\because\lambda_{m}^{MC*} - \lambda_{m}^{R*} = \text{ln}\ \lbrack\frac{9(4 - m)\beta_{R}}{4\beta_{D}} - \frac{{(4 - m)}^{2}(8 + m)\beta_{R}^{2}}{4{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{2}}\rbrack = \left\{ \begin{matrix}
{> 0,} & {2 < \varepsilon < 3} \\
{= 0,} & {\varepsilon = 3} \\
\end{matrix} \right.$$ $$\therefore\lambda_{m}^{MC*} \geq \lambda_{m}^{R*}$$ By Corollary 2.1, we obtain that $\lambda_{m}^{R*} > \lambda_{m}^{D*}$; then, we can infer that $\lambda_{m}^{MC*} \geq \lambda_{m}^{R*} > \lambda_{m}^{D*}$.
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QED {#sec013}
---

Based on corollary 3.1, we conclude that, in the mixed channel, the manufacturer's quality prevention effort level will be greater than that in the retail channel and the direct channel, and the retailer's quality inspection effort level will be greater than that in the retail channel, which will effectively eliminate the "free-riding behavior.

**Corollary 3.2** $\prod_{M}^{R*}(q_{R}^{*}) > \prod_{M}^{MC*}(q_{MC}^{*}) > \prod_{M}^{D*}(q_{D}^{*})$, $\prod_{R}^{MC*}(q_{MC}^{*}) > \prod_{R}^{R*}(q_{R}^{*})$.

**Proof.** We substitute formula (42), (43) and (44) into Eqs [(31)](#pone.0231699.e073){ref-type="disp-formula"} and [(32)](#pone.0231699.e075){ref-type="disp-formula"}, which yields the following: $$\prod_{M}^{MC*} = (\frac{\alpha^{3}(4 - m)}{6k\beta_{D}\beta_{R}} - \frac{\alpha^{3}{(4 - m)}^{2}(8 + m)}{54k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{2}}) - \eta_{m}\text{ln}\ {\eta_{m}}^{- 1}\lbrack\frac{\alpha^{3}(4 - m)}{6k\beta_{D}\beta_{R}} - \frac{\alpha^{3}{(4 - m)}^{2}(8 + m)}{54k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{2}}\rbrack - \eta_{m} - T$$ $$\prod_{R}^{MC*} = (\frac{\alpha^{3}(4 - m)}{24k\beta_{R}(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})} + \frac{\alpha^{3}{(4 - m)}^{3}\ \beta_{R}}{216k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{3}} - \frac{\alpha^{3}{(4 - m)}^{2}}{36k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{2}})$$ $$- \eta_{r}\text{ln}\ {\eta_{r}}^{- 1}\lbrack\frac{\alpha^{3}(4 - m)}{24k\beta_{R}(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})} + \frac{\alpha^{3}{(4 - m)}^{3}\beta_{R}}{216k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{3}} - \frac{\alpha^{3}{(4 - m)}^{2}}{36k{(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}^{2}}\rbrack - \eta_{r} + T$$ Therefore, we compare formula (49) and (50) with formula (13), (28) and (29) and obtain that $$\because\prod_{M}^{MC*}(q_{MC}^{*}) - \prod_{M}^{D*}(q_{D}^{*}) > 0,\ \prod_{M}^{MC*}(q_{MC}^{*}) - \prod_{M}^{R*}(q_{R}^{*}) < 0,{\ \prod}_{R}^{MC*}(q_{MC}^{*}) - \prod_{R}^{R*}(q_{R}^{*}) > 0$$ $$\because\prod_{M}^{R*}(q_{R}^{*}) > \prod_{M}^{MC*}(q_{MC}^{*}) > \ \prod_{M}^{D*}(q_{D}^{*}),\ \prod_{R}^{MC*}(q_{MC}^{*}) > {\ \prod}_{R}^{R*}(q_{R}^{*})$$

QED {#sec014}
---

Based on corollary 3.2, we infer that, in the mixed channel, the manufacturer's expected profits will be less than that in the retail channel but will be greater than the profits in the direct channel; additionally, the retailer's expected profits will be greater than that in the retail channel.

**Corollary 3.3** $CS^{MC*}(q_{MC}^{*}) > CS^{R*}(q_{R}^{*}) > CS^{D*}(q_{D}^{*})$.

**Proof.** The final customer's consumer surplus in a mixed channel will be described as follows $$CS^{MC*} = {\int_{a}^{(a + b)/2}{(\theta q_{MC}^{*} - p_{D}^{MC*})f(\theta)d\theta + {\int_{(a + b)/2}^{b}{(\theta q_{MC}^{*} - p_{R}^{MC*})f(\theta)d\theta}}}}$$ $$= \frac{(a - b)(4 - m)\alpha}{3k(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})} - \frac{1}{2}\lbrack\frac{\alpha^{2}{(4 - m)}^{2}}{6k{(\beta_{D} + \beta R)}^{2}} + \frac{\alpha^{2}(4 - m)(3\beta_{D} + 2\beta_{R})}{6k\beta_{D}\beta_{R}(\beta_{D} + \beta_{R})}\rbrack$$ Thereafter, we compare formula (52) with formula (14) and (30) and obtain that $${\therefore CS^{MC*} - CS^{D*} > 0},\quad{CS^{MC*} - CS^{R*} > 0},\quad{CS^{R*} > CS^{D*}}\mspace{9mu}\left( \text{corollary}\ 2.3\ \text{had\ proved} \right)$$

We find that $CS^{MC*} > CS^{R*} > CS^{D*}$.

QED {#sec015}
---

Based on corollary 3.3, we can infer that, in the mixed channel, the final customer's consumer surplus will be greater than that in the retail channel and the direct channel.

7 Numerical example {#sec016}
===================

In this paper, we assume a manufacturer that sells computer components through a retailer (retail channel) or internet online system (direct channel) or through a mixed channel to the final customer. The parameters are described as follows: *k* = 2, *η*~*m*~ = *η*~*r*~ = 1, *α* = 60, *θ \~ U*(0,60), *T* = 120, *ε* = {2.5, 3.0}, *β*~*R*~ \~ \[2.5, 3.5\]. We use numerical computing by Matlab 7.0 and obtain the results, as shown in Tables [1](#pone.0231699.t001){ref-type="table"}--[4](#pone.0231699.t004){ref-type="table"}.

10.1371/journal.pone.0231699.t001

###### In the direct channel scenario.

![](pone.0231699.t001){#pone.0231699.t001g}

  *ε* = 3.0   *ε* = 2.5                                                                                         
  ----------- ----------- -------- --------- ---------- --------- ------ -------- -------- --------- ---------- ---------
  7.50        4.9574      2.6680   14.2224   136.2650   65.7776   6.25   5.3220   3.2000   20.4800   198.4780   75.5200
  7.80        4.8790      2.5654   13.1494   125.6137   63.7737   6.50   5.2436   3.0769   18.9349   183.1055   73.3728
  8.10        4.8035      2.4704   12.1934   116.1293   61.8807   6.75   5.1681   2.9630   17.5583   169.4149   71.3306
  8.40        4.7307      2.3821   11.3380   107.6481   60.0906   7.00   5.0954   2.8571   16.3265   157.1699   69.3878
  8.70        4.6606      2.3000   10.5696   100.0339   58.3960   7.25   5.0252   2.7586   15.2200   146.1746   67.5386
  9.00        4.5927      2.2233   9.8767    93.1728    56.7900   7.50   4.9574   2.6667   14.2222   136.2648   65.7778
  9.30        4.5272      2.1516   9.2497    86.9692    55.2664   7.75   4.8918   2.5806   13.3195   127.3028   64.0999
  9.60        4.4637      2.0844   8.6807    81.3420    53.8193   8.00   4.8283   2.5000   12.5000   119.1717   62.5000
  9.90        4.4021      2.0212   8.1625    76.2223    52.4435   8.25   4.7668   2.4242   11.7539   111.7723   60.9734
  10.2000     4.3424      1.9618   7.6894    71.5512    51.1341   8.50   4.7071   2.3529   11.0727   105.0196   59.5156
  10.5000     4.2844      1.9057   7.2563    67.2780    49.8865   8.75   4.6491   2.2857   10.4490   98.8407    58.1224

10.1371/journal.pone.0231699.t002

###### In the retail channel scenario.

![](pone.0231699.t002){#pone.0231699.t002g}

  *Β*~*R*~   $\lambda_{m}^{R*}$   $\lambda_{r}^{R*}$   $q_{R}^{*}$   $w_{R}^{*}$   $p_{R}^{*}$   $\prod_{M}^{R*}$   $\prod_{R}^{R*}$   $CS^{R*}$
  ---------- -------------------- -------------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- ------------------ ------------------ -----------
  2.50       6.4615               5.7683               8.0000        128.0000      160.0000      1272.5385          313.2317           80.0000
  2.60       6.3830               5.6899               7.6923        118.3432      147.9290      1176.0489          289.1681           82.8402
  2.70       6.3075               5.6144               7.4074        109.7394      137.1742      1090.0861          267.7340           85.0480
  2.80       6.2348               5.5417               7.1429        102.0408      127.5510      1013.1734          248.5604           86.7347
  2.90       6.1646               5.4715               6.8966        95.1249       118.9061      944.0839           231.3406           87.9905
  3.00       6.0968               5.4037               6.6667        88.8889       111.1111      881.7921           215.8185           88.8889
  3.10       6.0312               5.3381               6.4516        83.2466       104.0583      825.4349           201.7784           89.4901
  3.20       5.9677               5.2746               6.2500        78.1250       97.6563       774.2823           189.0379           89.8438
  3.30       5.9062               5.2131               6.0606        73.4619       91.8274       727.7127           177.4417           89.9908
  3.40       5.8465               5.1534               5.8824        69.2042       86.5052       685.1950           166.8570           89.9654
  3.50       5.7885               5.0954               5.7143        65.3061       81.6327       646.2727           157.1699           89.7959

10.1371/journal.pone.0231699.t003

###### In the mixed channel scenario (*ε* = 3.0).

![](pone.0231699.t003){#pone.0231699.t003g}

  *β*~*R*~   $\lambda_{m}^{MC*}$   $\lambda_{r}^{MC*}$   $q_{MC}^{*}$   $w_{MC}^{*}$   $p_{D}^{MC*}$   $p_{R}^{MC*}$   $\prod_{M}^{MC*}$   $\prod_{R}^{MC*}$   $CS^{MC*}$
  ---------- --------------------- --------------------- -------------- -------------- --------------- --------------- ------------------- ------------------- ------------
  2.50       7.1546                5.7683                8.0000         128.0000       64.0000         160.0000        1151.8454           433.2317            128.0000
  2.60       7.0762                5.6899                7.6923         118.3432       59.1716         147.9290        1055.3558           409.1681            127.2189
  2.70       7.0007                5.6144                7.4074         109.7394       54.8697         137.1742        969.3930            387.7340            126.2003
  2.80       6.9280                5.5417                7.1429         102.0408       51.0204         127.5510        892.4802            368.5604            125.0000
  2.90       6.8578                5.4715                6.8966         95.1249        47.5624         118.9061        823.3907            351.3406            123.6623
  3.00       6.7900                5.4037                6.6667         88.8889        44.4444         111.1111        761.0989            335.8185            122.2222
  3.10       6.7244                5.3381                6.4516         83.2466        41.6233         104.0583        704.7418            321.7784            120.7076
  3.20       6.6609                5.2746                6.2500         78.1250        39.0625         97.6563         653.5891            309.0379            119.1406
  3.30       6.5994                5.2131                6.0606         73.4619        36.7309         91.8274         607.0196            297.4417            117.5390
  3.40       6.5396                5.1534                5.8824         69.2042        34.6021         86.5052         564.5019            286.8570            115.9170
  3.50       6.4817                5.0954                5.7143         65.3061        32.6531         81.6327         525.5796            277.1699            114.2857

10.1371/journal.pone.0231699.t004

###### In the mixed channel scenario (*ε* = 2.5).
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  *β*~*R*~   $\lambda_{m}^{MC*}$   $\lambda_{r}^{MC*}$   $q_{MC}^{*}$   $w_{MC}^{*}$   $p_{D}^{MC*}$   $p_{R}^{MC*}$   $\prod_{M}^{MC*}$   $\prod_{R}^{MC*}$   $CS^{MC*}$
  ---------- --------------------- --------------------- -------------- -------------- --------------- --------------- ------------------- ------------------- ------------
  2.50       7.2017                5.7914                6.5360         99.8128        52.7453         128.3522        1213.5631           440.6938            105.5656
  2.60       7.1233                5.7130                6.2846         92.2825        48.7660         118.6688        1112.4137           416.0655            104.8541
  2.70       7.0478                5.6375                6.0519         85.5734        45.2206         110.0413        1022.2992           394.1283            103.9564
  2.80       6.9751                5.5648                5.8357         79.5702        42.0482         102.3216        941.6716            374.5045            102.9172
  2.90       6.9049                5.4946                5.6345         74.1772        39.1983         95.3866         869.2449            356.8803            101.7716
  3.00       6.8371                5.4268                5.4467         69.3144        36.6287         89.1334         803.9440            340.9935            100.5476
  3.10       6.7715                5.3612                5.2710         64.9147        34.3036         83.4757         744.8643            326.6235            99.2671
  3.20       6.7080                5.2977                5.1063         60.9209        32.1932         78.3399         691.2402            313.5834            97.9478
  3.30       6.6465                5.2362                4.9515         57.2847        30.2716         73.6640         642.4206            301.7145            96.6037
  3.40       6.5868                5.1765                4.8059         53.9645        28.5171         69.3946         597.8483            290.8809            95.2459
  3.50       6.5288                5.1185                4.6686         50.9249        26.9109         65.4858         557.0451            280.9658            93.8833

Based on [Table 1](#pone.0231699.t001){ref-type="table"}, we conclude that, in the direct channel, the manufacturer's product quality level, the quality prevention effort level and the direct sale price will increase, and the customer's consumer surplus will also increase with the decreasing in the product demand price elasticity, which will benefit the manufacturer and the final customer when the distribution channel demand elasticity ratio decreases.

Based on [Table 2](#pone.0231699.t002){ref-type="table"}, we can infer that, in the retail channel, the final customer's consumer surplus will increase with the increasing in product demand price elasticity. Compared with the direct channel, the manufacturer's product quality level, the quality prevention effort level and the expected profits will increase, and the customer's consumer surplus will also increase.

Based on Tables [3](#pone.0231699.t003){ref-type="table"} and [4](#pone.0231699.t004){ref-type="table"}, Figs [2](#pone.0231699.g002){ref-type="fig"} and [3](#pone.0231699.g003){ref-type="fig"}, we conclude that in the mixed channel compared with that in the direct channel and the retail channel, the manufacturer will determine a transfer payment to eliminate channel conflict, the manufacturer's quality prevention effort level and retailer's quality inspection effort level will increase, which will effectively eliminate the "free-riding behavior", the manufacturer's expected profits will be higher than which in the direct channel and less than which in the retail channel; in addition, the retailer's expected profits and the final consumer surplus will increase.

![The product quality level in three types of distribution channels.](pone.0231699.g002){#pone.0231699.g002}

![The customer's consumer surplus in three types of distribution channels.](pone.0231699.g003){#pone.0231699.g003}

8 Conclusions and future research {#sec017}
=================================

In this paper, we construct a product quality control model of three types of distribution channel (direct channel, retail channel and mixed channel) in a three-echelon supply chain, which is comprised by one manufacturer, one retailer and the final customer, and then we discuss how to design a distribution channel strategy and craft a quality control strategy. Furthermore, our paper analyzes three types of distribution channel strategies regarding how to influence the manufacturer's product quality decision and quality prevention strategy, the retailer's product pricing decision and quality inspection strategy, and the final customer's product demand decision. We compare the product quality level in three types of distribution channels and solve the manufacturer's and retailer's expected profits functions and the final customer's consumer surplus. In addition, we introduce the distribution channel demand elasticity ratio to analyze the influence of determining the product quality control strategy.

Our paper demonstrates that, in the direct channel, the manufacturer's product quality level, the quality prevention effort level and the direct sale price will increase, and the customer's consumer surplus will also increase with the decreasing in the products demand price elasticity. In addition, in the retail channel which is compared with the direct channel scenario, the manufacturer's product quality level, the wholesale price, the quality prevention effort level and expected profits will increase, and the retailer's retail price, the quality inspection effort level and the customer's consumer surplus will be much higher. In the mixed channel, the manufacturer will determine the transfer payment to eliminate channel conflict, the manufacturer's quality prevention effort level and the retailer's quality inspection effort level will increase, which will effectively eliminate the "free-riding behavior". In addition, the manufacturer's expected profits will be higher than that in the direct channel and less than that in the retail channel. The retailer's expected profits and the final consumer surplus will also increase, and our conclusions will be a strong complement to the research field. Most importantly, we conduct a numerical sample analysis that demonstrates the model's effectiveness and the conclusions' correctness and will also indicate a specific application in practice.

In further research, we will assume that the manufacturer's quality prevention effort level and the retailer's quality inspection effort level have incomplete information regarding how to craft a product quality control strategy in three types of distribution channels; then, we will also attempt to construct a multi-stage, repeat and asymmetry information dynamic game model and analyze the distribution channel strategy regarding how to influence the manufacturer's and retailer's expected profits function, the final customer's consumer surplus and social welfare.

The authors are grateful to the referees for their valuable comments and their helps on how to improve the quality of our paper.

10.1371/journal.pone.0231699.r001
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Dear Professor Dejan Dragan and Reviewers,

Thank you very much for your suggestions and critical comments about our paper submitted to PLOS ONE (Manuscript ID: PONE-D-19-20228). The revised title is "Supply Chain Product Quality Control Strategy in Three Types of Distribution Channels".

We are also thankful to the reviewers for their critical reading and valuable comments on the manuscript. Those comments were very helpful for providing direction for our further studies. We have tried our best to revise our manuscript according to the comments. Attached, please find the revised version, which we would like to resubmit for your kind consideration. The main revised parts are marked in blue in the paper. The following is a detailed explanation how we have complied with the editor's and reviewers' suggestions.

Responds to the editor's comments:
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The paper deploys a three-stage Stackelberg dynamic game analysis and constructs a product quality control strategy model for three types of distribution channels (direct channel, retail channel, and mixed channel) in a three-echelon supply chain, which is composed of one manufacturer, one retailer and the final customer. Furthermore, the paper studies how to design a distribution channel strategy and provides a product quality control strategy. Here, three types of distribution channels strategy in the context of how they influence a manufacturer's product quality decision and prevention strategy, a retailer's product pricing decision and quality inspection strategy, and the final customer's product demand decision, are analyzed. The subject of this research is up-to-date and fundamentally interesting for scholars from the field of SCM and OR.

The paper, in general, roughly satisfies all rigor requirements that are demanded from Plos One. The red clue remains more or less consistent all over the paper, while the derivations of equations seem to be adequate.

Response: Thank you very much for the highly praises and the valuable suggestions. Our paper constructs a product quality control strategy model for three types of distribution channels (direct channel, retail channel and mixed channel) in a three-echelon supply chain which use a three-stage stackelberg dynamic game analysis, and then, analyzes three types of distribution channels strategy in the context of how they influence a manufacturer's product quality decision and quality prevention strategy, a retailer's product pricing decision and quality inspection strategy, and the final customer's product demand decision. Most importantly, we conduct a numerical sample analysis that will prove the model's effectiveness and indicate a specific application in practice.

Comment \#2:

It is not clear enough emphasized what the main contribution of the paper is, i.e., what has been done new, if compared with the work of the other researchers. Here, the borderline should be clearly highlighted, while the main contributions (novelties, originality) should be more explicitly given in the introduction and other places, where necessary.

Response: Thank you very much for the valuable suggestions. We rewrite and emphasize the paper's main contributions in every paragraph in "2 Related Literature", just like: (1) Our paper differs from the existing literature by introducing the distribution channel demand elasticity ratio and investigating how to construct a product quality control strategy model and channel coordination in three types of distribution channels (direct channel, retail channel, and mixed channel) by providing a new perspective. (2) Our model contributes to the product quality control strategy research by constructing a distribution channel model in a three-echelon supply chain which is composed of one manufacturer, one retailer and the final customer based on a three-stage stackelberg dynamic game. Then, the model considers the manufacturer's product quality decision and quality prevention strategy, the retailer's product pricing decision and quality inspection strategy, and the final customer's product demand decision. (3) we also establish a product quality control strategy model in three types of distribution channels to eliminate the influence of "channel conflict" and "free-riding behavior", which will improve the manufacturer's and retailer's expected profits and the final customer's consumer surplus.

Comment \#3:

Figure 1 should be improved in the sense of informative content meaning that the reader immediately understands the main point without even looking at the corresponding text.

Response: Thank you very much for the valuable suggestions. We redraw the Figure 1 Three types of distribution channels decision system which improve in the sense of informative content meaning that the reader immediately understands the main point of our paper.

Figure 1 Three types of distribution channels decision system

Responds to the reviewer's comments:

Comment \#1:

The language of the article should be more concise and accurate.

Response: Thank you very much for the valuable suggestions. We made necessary revisions and language editing in the manuscript according to your suggestions, and the English has also been edited by Wiley English Language Editing Services.

Comment \#2:

It is better to complement the differences between this study and the existing research literature.

Response: Thank you very much for the valuable suggestions. We rewrite and emphasize the paper's main contributions in every paragraph in "2 Related Literature", just like: (1) Our paper differs from the existing literature by introducing the distribution channel demand elasticity ratio and investigating how to construct a product quality control strategy model and channel coordination in three types of distribution channels (direct channel, retail channel, and mixed channel) by providing a new perspective. (2) Our model contributes to the product quality control strategy research by constructing a distribution channel model in a three-echelon supply chain which is composed of one manufacturer, one retailer and the final customer based on a three-stage stackelberg dynamic game. Then, the model considers the manufacturer's product quality decision and quality prevention strategy, the retailer's product pricing decision and quality inspection strategy, and the final customer's product demand decision. (3) we also establish a product quality control strategy model in three types of distribution channels to eliminate the influence of "channel conflict" and "free-riding behavior", which will improve the manufacturer's and retailer's expected profits and the final customer's consumer surplus.

Comment \#3:

The conclusions of the study for the objectives mentioned in the abstract as 'This paper studies how to design a distribution channel strategy and provides a product quality control strategy' are not very clear.

Response: Thank you very much for the valuable suggestions. With the changing in customer or consumer buying behavior, more and more companies are beginning to redesign or rebuild their distribution channel structure, Such as HP, Nike, Lenovo, in addition to focus on the traditional retail channel, have also opened up an internet channel(direct channel); Dell, MI has been focused on internet channel in the past, and now also began selling products in traditional retail channel; and Apple, Haier sell their products in the traditional retail channel and internet channel in the same time, which used a mixed channel structure. In our paper, we will construct a distribution channel strategy model in a three echelon supply chain that is composed of one manufacturer, one retailer and a final customer based on a three-stage stackelberg dynamic game. Furthermore, we will introduce the distribution channel demand elasticity ratio and investigate how to craft a product quality control strategy in three types of distribution channels (direct channel, retail channel, and mixed channel), Most important, we will determine the manufacturer's product quality level, quality prevention effort level, wholesale price, direct sale price, and the retailer's product quality inspection effort level and retail price, the manufacturer's and retailer's expected profits function, and the final customer's consumer surplus.

Comment \#4:

In this article, we can not see how consumer utility and consumer behavior affect product market demand.

Response: Thank you very much for the valuable suggestions. In "3 The Model and Assumption", we describe that the final customer's quality utility is, and denotes the type of final customer, is the manufacturer's product quality level; furthermore, denote the direct channel, the retail channel and the mixed channel respectively; then, we assume ～ uniform distribution, and the corresponding final customer's consumer surplus is.

Therefore, in direct channel, we can describe the final customer's consumer surplus as = = (14)

In retail channel, we can describe the final customer's consumer surplus as

= = (30)

In mixed channel, we can describe the final customer's consumer surplus as

= +

= (52)

Comment \#5:

In Mixed Channel, how does the product demand between the two channels affect each other?

Response: Thank you very much for the valuable suggestions. In our paper, we describe the mixed channel that the manufacturer sells their products in the traditional retail channel by the retailer, in the same time, the manufacturer sells their products to the final customer in direct channel (internet channel). The final customer's product demand function will be ; denotes the market maximum demand, and is the product demand price elasticity. Therefore, In mixed channel, the manufacturer and the retailer's stackelberg "leader-follower" control model can be described as follows:

=

\+ - - (31)

s.t.

= (32)

The product demand in retail channel as

The product demand in direct channel as

is the manufacturer's product quality level in mixed channel, is the product demand price elasticity in retail channel, is the product demand price elasticity in direct channel, is the manufacturer's wholesale price, is the retailer's retail price, is the direct sale price in a direct channel, the manufacturer's product quality cost function in direct channel is .

We have tried our best to improve the manuscript and made some substantial changes and necessary deletions according to the editors' and reviewers' comments. We earnestly appreciate the editors' and reviewers' professional work and hope that the corrections will make our manuscript suitable for publication in PLOS ONE. We are looking forward to receiving comments from reviewers in the future.

Once again, thank you very much for your valuable comments and suggestions.
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Comment \#3:

Has the statistical analysis been performed appropriately and rigorously?

Reviewer \#2: Yes

Reviewer \#3: Yes

Response: Thank you very much for the valuable suggestions.

Comment \#4:
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Is the manuscript presented in an intelligible fashion and written in standard English?
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2\. The model and assumption need to be more concise and concrete. For example, when the author mentioned the customer type follow a U\[a,b\], it needs more clarify about the value means and the types they are referring to. It will be better if the author check the model and assumption part one more time and provide additional explanation if necessary.

Response to Reviewer \#2: Thank you very much for the valuable suggestions. We have revised and completed all comments provided by the editor and reviewers in the first round.

Response to Reviewer \#3: Thank you very much for the valuable suggestions.

1\. We have revised the literature review part, which is chiefly related to three streams of literature, it seems not to be too detailed, which is mentioned the related papers and on top of that, provide their own contributions. Moreover, those contributions should be more precise as line 150-160.

In this paper, first of all, we will introduce the distribution channel demand elasticity ratio and investigating how to construct a product quality control strategy model and channel coordination in three types of distribution channels (direct channel, retail channel, and mixed channel); what's more, we consider the manufacturer's product quality decision and quality prevention strategy, the retailer's product pricing decision and quality inspection strategy, and the final customer's product demand decision in a three-echelon supply chain; above all, we also establish a product quality control strategy model in three types of distribution channels to eliminate the influence of "channel conflict" and "free-riding behavior", which will improve the manufacturer's and retailer's expected profits and the final customer's consumer surplus.

2\. We have revised model and assumption more concise and concrete in line 174-l96.

For example, The final customer's quality utility is , and denotes the type of final customer; then, we assume Ɵ\~U\[a, b\] uniform distribution, i.e. a is the final customer lower limit of distribution quantity, b is the final customer upper limit of distribution quantity, and the corresponding final customer's consumer surplus is .

We have checked the model and assumption part one more time, and then, provided additional explanation more clearly and accurately.

We have tried our best to improve the manuscript and made some substantial changes and necessary deletions according to the editors' and reviewers' comments. We earnestly appreciate the editors' and reviewers' professional work and hope that the corrections will make our manuscript suitable for publication in PLOS ONE. We are looking forward to receiving comments from reviewers in the future.

Once again, thank you very much for your valuable comments and suggestions.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Lilong Zhu

###### 

Submitted filename: Response to Reviewers.doc

###### 

Click here for additional data file.

10.1371/journal.pone.0231699.r005

Decision Letter 2

Dragan

Dejan

Academic Editor

© 2020 Dejan Dragan

2020

Dejan Dragan

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the

Creative Commons Attribution License

, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

31 Mar 2020

Supply Chain Product Quality Control Strategy in Three Types of Distribution Channels

PONE-D-19-20228R2

Dear authors,

We are pleased to inform you that your manuscript has been judged scientifically suitable for publication and will be formally accepted for publication once it complies with all outstanding technical requirements.

Within one week, you will receive an e-mail containing information on the amendments required prior to publication. When all required modifications have been addressed, you will receive a formal acceptance letter and your manuscript will proceed to our production department and be scheduled for publication.

Shortly after the formal acceptance letter is sent, an invoice for payment will follow. To ensure an efficient production and billing process, please log into Editorial Manager at <https://www.editorialmanager.com/pone/>, click the \"Update My Information\" link at the top of the page, and update your user information. If you have any billing related questions, please contact our Author Billing department directly at <authorbilling@plos.org>.

If your institution or institutions have a press office, please notify them about your upcoming paper to enable them to help maximize its impact. If they will be preparing press materials for this manuscript, you must inform our press team as soon as possible and no later than 48 hours after receiving the formal acceptance. Your manuscript will remain under strict press embargo until 2 pm Eastern Time on the date of publication. For more information, please contact <onepress@plos.org>.

With kind regards,

Dejan Dragan, PhD

Academic Editor

PLOS ONE

Additional Editor Comments (optional):

The improvements have been noticeable so that the paper deserves to be published in the Plos One.

Reviewers\' comments:

10.1371/journal.pone.0231699.r006

Acceptance letter

Dragan

Dejan

Academic Editor

© 2020 Dejan Dragan

2020

Dejan Dragan

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the

Creative Commons Attribution License

, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

6 Apr 2020

PONE-D-19-20228R2

Supply Chain Product Quality Control Strategy in Three Types of Distribution Channels

Dear Dr. Zhu:

I am pleased to inform you that your manuscript has been deemed suitable for publication in PLOS ONE. Congratulations! Your manuscript is now with our production department.

If your institution or institutions have a press office, please notify them about your upcoming paper at this point, to enable them to help maximize its impact. If they will be preparing press materials for this manuscript, please inform our press team within the next 48 hours. Your manuscript will remain under strict press embargo until 2 pm Eastern Time on the date of publication. For more information please contact <onepress@plos.org>.

For any other questions or concerns, please email <plosone@plos.org>.

Thank you for submitting your work to PLOS ONE.

With kind regards,

PLOS ONE Editorial Office Staff

on behalf of

Dr. Dejan Dragan

Academic Editor

PLOS ONE

[^1]: **Competing Interests:**The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
